[Editor’s note: In the wake of the latest national security breach, in which classified Pentagon documents related to the war in Ukraine were disseminated online, Liberty Nation’s National Security Correspondent Dave Patterson digs into how America’s most sensitive materials are handled. Part two of this series can be read here.]
The information classification system expects people to follow protocols. That’s the system’s glaring and irrefutable flaw. It may seem like stating the obvious, but the weakness in the system designed to protect America’s sensitive information is that people can mess it up, as was demonstrated by US Air National Guard Airman First Class Jack Teixeira’s abrogation of his signed oath to keep Department of Defense’s secrets safe.
Stringent Guidelines Fail to Stop Leaks
As Liberty Nation reported, Defense Department Press Secretary Air Force Brigadier General Pat Ryder made the point repeatedly in a briefing that “the DOD has ‘stringent’ guidelines in place and that the unauthorized release of the classified documents was a criminal act where the perpetrator purposefully violated those guidelines and regulations.” That is precisely the point. Despite protocols, processes, regulations, individual training of all security clearance holders, service members, and contractors, and policies to prevent unauthorized, criminal disclosures, people still disclose classified information.
Teixeira’s job was cyber transport systems journeyman, commonly referred to as information technology (IT) specialist. He had a top-secret, sensitive compartmented information (TS-SCI) clearance. He worked the night shift for the 102nd Intelligence Wing at Joint Base Cape Cod, Massachusetts. “There, he had broad access to a secure facility where he could access a global network of classified material from the military and 17 other American intelligence agencies,” The New York Times reported. However, Teixeira’s position neither required nor authorized his accessing that network.
Nonetheless, Teixeira looked at highly classified data, took notes, downloaded, removed from his workplace, photographed, and posted the classified material to a private server on a gaming chat service called Discord. None of his supervisors or co-workers had reported anything unusual. Was there a night supervisor managing Teixeira’s work schedule and assigning tasks? Where was the unit leadership? Seldom have there been intentional, unlawful disclosures of national security information without some suspicious indicators.
Training Is Required to Stop Leaks
Chelsea Manning (Photo by Diego Donamaria/Getty Images for SXSW)
Every person with a security clearance working for the US government is required to attend Insider Threat Awareness training. An essential part of the curriculum is how to spot key indicators that a co-worker or colleague may be a security threat. A recent famous example is Army Private First Class Bradley (AKA Chelsea) Manning, a soldier struggling with gender dysphoria while posted to a remote Iraqi Forward Operating Base Hammer “where morale was rock bottom and security slipshod. Increasingly disillusioned with the US mission, [Manning exhibited deteriorating behavior], culminating in his punching a female officer in the face,” The Guardian reported. His actions indicated the presence of a potential security threat. Processes were in place but not followed. People failed. Supervision failed. Leadership failed.
Not as infamous is the case of US Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Bryan Martin, who attempted to sell classified information to an individual he thought to be a Chinese intelligence officer. Martin was in deep financial trouble because of his uncontrollable gambling and habit of hiring prostitutes, problems known to his co-workers. According to official government records, he was arrested when he attempted to sell “packets of documents containing Secret and Top Secret information about current naval operations and intelligence assessments” to an undercover FBI agent. Tried and found guilty, Martin was sentenced to 34 years in prison. In this case, recognizing and reporting indicators of insider threats worked. The processes, procedures, and protocols are in place, but they are effective only if people take responsibility and follow them appropriately.
The knee-jerk reaction in any bureaucracy, when people behave in a way that puts the organization in jeopardy, is to “fix” the processes or procedures if there is something systematically wrong. But most of the time, despite efforts to eliminate perceived process flaws, if people are motivated to break the law, they will break the law. Military members of all ranks are responsible for recognizing changes in the behavior of co-workers and colleagues. Family problems, financial pressures, and sudden expressions of eccentric ideological points of view may be signs of a security threat in the making.
(In Part 2, Liberty Nation will explore the world of classified information in which national security employees work.)
