On August 6, Ukraine’s military forces attacked inside Russia. Kyiv surprised Moscow’s ground forces with what started as isolated raids over the border into Russian territory, and now, after two weeks of fighting, Ukrainian troops have captured and are holding over 350 square kilometers of the Russian fatherland in the Kursk Oblast region. It was a gutsy move. What long-term value will the incursion have, and if it can be or should be sustained, is the strategy question for Kyiv.
Ukraine Incursion Into Russia Decisive
The move by Ukraine has been decisive and successful in its initial stages. The speed with which the combat action took place is an essential factor in Ukraine’s success in its move into Russia’s Kursk Oblast. According to the Associated Press:
“The surprise attack by Ukrainian troops in tanks and other armored vehicles began Aug. 6 and came from several directions into Russia’s Kursk region. Although Russia has seen previous incursions of its territory in the war, the Kursk raid is notable for its size, speed, the reported involvement of battle-hardened Ukrainian brigades, and the length of time they have stayed inside Russia.”
Reports from the Kursk battlefield reveal that about 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers were part of the invading force. From a historical perspective, this invasion is the “first time foreign troops have invaded and held the territory since Nazi Germany did it in World War II against the Soviet Union,” the AP observed. However, taking territory and keeping territory are two very different operations.
Ukraine ground commanders are consolidating and establishing control over the area occupied in Russia, according to first-hand accounts by the Institute for the Study of War. Managing and providing logistics support in Kursk while engaged further southeast in the Donbas region, however, is a struggle for Ukraine. Effectively, Ukraine is fighting on two very fluid fronts.
In the past, moves similar to the bold Kyiv Kursk offensive have met with mixed outcomes. The most notorious strategic turn in a major confrontation where large armies were locked in combat was the World War II Battle of the Bulge. In an unanticipated move on Dec. 16, 1944, the Germans, with 200,000 troops and nearly 1,000 tanks, engaged in a counteroffensive surrounding the Belgian town of Bastogne in the Ardennes Forest. Meeting fierce resistance from US Army and Allied forces and suffering poorly planned logistics support, the Nazi thrust into Allied lines failed. German tanks ran out of fuel and were abandoned. German infantry without tanks eventually fell to courageous US and Allied defenses. In the end the Germans outran their resupply capability.
Ukrainian forces will be faced with similar logistics challenges. There is a point where the magnitude of the level of combat necessary to maintain Ukrainian forces moving further into Russia will likely exceed Kyiv’s capability. A recent DefenseOne article explained: “Even in the boldness of the current incursion, the Ukrainians must be ready to accept when the spread of their military forces has culminated. They will inevitably reach a point where if they don’t shift to the defensive – either in Kursk or back in Ukraine – they risk catastrophic defeat in detail.” However, the Russians are also faced with daunting combat trials.
Moscow’s Battlefield Challenges
The new front in the Kursk Oblast demands that Moscow commit reserve units or pull forces from the southeast Donbas and move them north to engage the Ukraine push. Russian command and control capability has been shown to be very weak in adjusting to major changes in the combat landscape. Disengaging from a fixed battle, moving infantry, armor, and large motorized units is difficult. Though fielding a much larger total force, Moscow’s armies are less agile than Ukraine’s ground troops. This may account for the Kursk operation looking more like a series of independent raids. “Any fixed position would be exposed to potentially devastating Russian airstrikes and would be difficult to defend against Russian troops attacking from different sides. Russia, after all, has the upper hand in forces and weapons,” The New York Times explained.
However, capturing over 74 towns located in approximately 400 square miles of the Russian homeland, holding over 100 of Moscow’s soldiers as prisoners, and destroying numerous SU-34 fighter-bombers is not without benefit to Kyiv. From an emotional perspective, the Ukrainians are dishing out to Russian towns and villages the pain the Ukrainian people have suffered for more than two-and-a-half years. More practically, the Kursk operation allows Kyiv to exert negotiating leverage for prisoner exchanges and a more subtle logic focused on the West. “The Ukrainians may be trying to convince the West that they will not give up, and that the United States in particular should allow them to use American long-range cruise missiles inside Russia,” the NYT speculated.
Regardless of motives or results, the Ukrainian offensive into Kursk was a bold stroke of battlefield strategy. With this win, Ukraine’s leadership will likely push the US and NATO to take advantage of the initiative by providing and continuing more timely support. Ukraine has demonstrated that it is willing to do the heavy lifting.
The views expressed are those of the author and not of any other affiliate.
